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*Genscher - Poland  
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INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5707  
RUDKRW/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 6111  
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 8946  
RUEHDD/NATO COLLECTIVE  
RUDKRP/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 4175  
RUDKDA/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 3500  
RUDKSA/AMEMBASSY SOFIA 2990  
RUDKAR/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 4081  
RUDKRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 5089  
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, GE, PO  
SUBJ: FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER TO VISIT POLAND  
NOVEMBER 21-23

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. BEGIN SUMMARY: FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER WILL

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VISIT POLAND NOVEMBER 21-23. FOREIGN OFFICE CONTACTS SAY THAT GENSCHER HAS A STRONG PERSONAL INTEREST IN RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPE AND POLAND, ESPECIALLY NOW WHEN HE SEES ACCESS TO THE SOVIET UNION AS GREATLY REDUCED. ACCORDING TO FOREIGN OFFICE SOURCES, THE POLES WOULD HAVE PREFERRED A NON-GERMAN IN RESUMING THE WESTERN DIALOGUE. NONETHELESS THEY WILL TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO PURSUE GENSCHER ON ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE-- HE WILL NOT BE RESPONSIVE. GENSCHER, WHO WILL DISCUSS PROBLEMS OF ETHNIC GERMANS IN POLAND, CHURCH AID TO AGRICULTURE, AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, SEES THE TRIP LARGELY IN SYMBOLIC TERMS. HE ADHERES TO THE FAMILIAR NOTION THAT KEEPING OPEN THE CONTACTS AVOIDS FORCING POLAND FURTHER INTO THE SOVIET EMBRACE. IN THE COURSE OF HIS VISIT HE WILL HAVE TO CONTEND WITH PERSISTENT POLISH CONCERNS OVER GERMAN "REVANCHISM." WE THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO PROVIDE OUR OWN ASSESSMENT ON POLAND PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE. END SUMMARY.

3. ON AUGUST 20, EMBOFF DISCUSSED WITH FOREIGN OFFICE DEPUTY FOR EAST EUROPEAN AFFAIRS WEISS FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER'S PLANNED TRIP TO POLAND. WEISS SAID THAT THE VISIT WAS NOW SET FOR NOVEMBER 21-23 AND THAT THE ALLIES WERE BEING INFORMED THROUGH THE GERMAN MISSION TO NATO. HE CAUTIONED THAT THESE DATES WERE NOT YET THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.

4. WEISS SAID THAT, WITH THE VISIT STILL MANY WEEKS AWAY, SPECIFIC DETAILS HAD OBVIOUSLY NOT YET BEEN WORKED OUT. HE DID SAY, HOWEVER, THAT GENSCHER WAS LIKELY TO VISIT AT LEAST ONE CITY OUTSIDE WARSAW-- POSSIBLY KRAKOW. HE ALSO SAID THAT POLITICAL DIRECTOR PFEFFER WOULD TRAVEL TO POLAND IN OCTOBER TO MAKE FINAL ARRANGEMENTS.

5. GENSCHER HAD, IN CONVERSATIONS WITH ALLIES, REGULARLY STRESSED HIS BELIEF THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE WEST TO MAINTAIN TIES WITH THE POLES, WEISS NOTED. AND, WITH SOVIETS HAVING "WALLED THEMSELVES IN", MAKING PROFITABLE EXCHANGES VERY DIFFICULT, GENSCHER FELT IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER TO STAY IN TOUCH WITH OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. THIS WAS WHY,

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WEISS CONTENDED, BONN HAD BEEN--AND WOULD BE--SO ACTIVE OF LATE IN PROMOTING HIGH-LEVEL EXCHANGES WITH BLOC COUNTRIES.

6. WEISS WAS CANDID. HE SAID THAT THE POLES WOULD HAVE PREFERRED THAT THE FIRST HIGH-LEVEL VISITOR NOT BE A GERMAN. THE POLES WERE WELL AWARE THAT GENSCHER HAD BEEN A PROPONENT OF A SOMEWHAT MORE CONCILIATORY APPROACH TOWARD THEM IN WESTERN COUNCILS. BUT, ACCORDING TO WEISS, THEY DID NOT LIKE THE IDEA OF BEING "OBLIGATED" TO A GERMAN. THEY WOULD HAVE PREFERRED SOMEONE ELSE TO RESUME THE DIALOGUE AND HAD INVITED ANDREOTTI--BUT HE WAS NOT GOING UNTIL DECEMBER.

7. WEISS CHARACTERIZED OTHER EC MEMBERS AS BASICALLY SUPPORTIVE OF THE TRIP, ALTHOUGH HE SAID THAT MITTERRAND WAS HOLDING TO A STRICTER LINE AND CLEARLY, HE IMPLIED, THE FRENCH WERE UNENTHUSIASTIC. HE DESCRIBED THE EARLIER AMERICAN REACTION TO THE TRIP PROPOSAL AS "SEVERE", BUT SEEMED TO FEEL THAT OUR VIEW WAS NOW "MORE NEUTRAL--NEITHER YES NOR NO."

8. WEISS SEVERAL TIMES MENTIONED GENSCHER'S LONG-STANDING PERSONAL INTEREST IN POLAND AND HIS NOTION THAT "GIVING UP ON THE POLES" WOULD SURELY DRIVE THEM INTO SOVIET ARMS. (COMMENT: THIS IS, OF COURSE, A FAMILIAR REFRAIN USED TO RATIONALIZE CONTACT WITH ALL KINDS OF PEOPLE BESIDES POLES--INCLUDING LIBYANS AND IRANIANS. END COMMENT.) WITHOUT EXAGGERATING THE DEGREE OF SUCH INFLUENCE, GENSCHER BELIEVED THAT GERMAN--AND WESTERN--CONTACTS PROVIDED A "CERTAIN COUNTER-WEIGHT" TO THE SOVIETS. BESIDE, WEISS ADDED, MARTIAL LAW NOTWITHSTANDING, POLAND'S REGIME WAS STILL "MORE LIBERAL" THAN THOSE IN SEVERAL OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN

COUNTRIES.

9. ACCORDING TO WEISS, GENSCHER'S INTEREST IN POLAND WAS REINFORCED BY HIS PERSONAL ACQUAINTANCE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER OLSZOWSKI WHOM HE HAS KNOWN SINCE THE MID-1970'S. THEY HAD MET SEVERAL TIMES IN RECENT YEARS--IN NEW YORK, MADRID, STOCKHOLM AND MOSCOW (ANDROPOV'S FUNERAL).

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10. GENSCHER AND HIS STAFF VIEWED THE COMING VISIT TO WARSAW LARGELY AS A SYMBOLIC POLITICAL GESTURE. WEISS MAINTAINED, THEY FULLY ANTICIPATED, HOWEVER, THAT THE POLES WOULD BE EAGER TO DISCUSS ECONOMIC QUESTIONS AND WOULD BE LOOKING FOR "NEW MONEY." THEY WOULD, NO DOUBT, POINT TO THE MOST RECENT EXTENSION OF FRG CREDITS TO THE EAST GERMANS. THEY WOULD NOT RECEIVE MUCH ENCOURAGEMENT, HOWEVER, SINCE THE FRG WAS HEWING CLOSELY TO THE ALLIED POSITION ON POLISH CREDITS. INDEED, THE GERMANS WERE STILL URGING THEM TO PAY INTEREST ALREADY OWED TO THEMSELVES AND THE UNITED STATES.

11. OTHER ISSUES LIKELY TO ARISE INCLUDED THE PERSISTENT QUESTION OF RESETTLING ETHNIC GERMANS FROM POLAND. GENSCHER, WEISS SAID, HAD AN ABIDING PERSONAL INTEREST IN THE ISSUE AND WAS CONCERNED THAT THE OUTFLOW HAD BEEN GREATLY REDUCED. WEISS EXPECTED THAT THE POLES MIGHT BARGAIN ON THE ISSUE FOR CREDITS LIKE THE EAST GERMANS. (HE ALSO OFFERED A FEW UNKIND WORDS ABOUT CARDINAL GLEMP'S RECENT ASSERTION THAT THERE WERE NO LONGER ANY ETHNIC GERMANS IN POLAND.)

12. WEISS FURTHER ANTICIPATED THAT THE CHURCH PROJECT FOR AID TO POLISH AGRICULTURE WOULD ALSO BE TAKEN UP, MORE SPECIFICALLY IN A DISCUSSION WITH THE PRIMATE THAN IN TALKS WITH GOVERNMENT LEADERS. (HE WAS AWARE OF THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF U.S. PARTICIPATION.) HE SAID THAT MONEY FROM THE GERMAN CHURCH WAS SET, BUT EC FUNDS WERE UNLIKELY FOR THIS YEAR. HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE BONN GOVERNMENT WOULD BE ABLE TO COME UP WITH ITS OWN CONTRIBUTION IN 1989.

13. ARMS CONTROL ISSUES WOULD ALSO FIGURE IN THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S TALKS, WEISS PREDICTED. HOWEVER, ALTHOUGH HE WOULD CALL FOR A SOVIET RETURN TO INF TALKS IN GENEVA, GENSCHER DID NOT VIEW THE POLES AS AN INFLUENTIAL CONDUIT FOR PASSING MESSAGES TO THE SOVIETS. TREATMENT OF ARMS CONTROL ISSUES WOULD, WEISS SAID, BE LARGELY PRO FORMA.

14. FINALLY, WEISS THOUGHT, THE POLES WERE LIKELY TO

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TAKE UP THE REVANCHISM CHARGES. DESPITE POLITICAL REASSURANCES FROM GENSCHER THAT THE PAGES OF HISTORY COULD NOT BE TURNED BACK, THE POLES WOULD NOT BE CONVINCED. THIS WOULD BE TRUE AS LONG AS THE FRG LEGAL POSITION WAS THAT THE FRG GOVERNMENT CANNOT BIND THE ACTIONS OF A FUTURE UNIFIED GERMANY SUBSEQUENT TO A PEACE TREATY. THIS, THE POLES WOULD ARGUE, REALLY MEANS A GERMAN DREAM OF RECONQUERING THE FORMER EASTERN PROVINCES LIVES ON. THE POINT, WEISS SAID, WAS THAT FOR THE POLES, REVANCHIST CHARGES WERE NOT SIMPLY A PAWNING OF THE MOSCOW LINE--THEY REALLY WERE AFRAID OF WHAT THE FUTURE COULD BRING. HE ADDED THAT THE POLES WERE ALWAYS NERVOUS WHEN THE GERMANS WERE TALKING TO EACH OTHER. ]

15. COMMENT: WEISS EXPECTS THAT, AS HE HAS PRIOR TO OTHER SUCH JOURNEYS, FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER WILL SOLICIT THE SECRETARY'S VIEWS BEFORE DEPARTING FOR WARSAW. IN ANY CASE, IT SEEMS TO US HERE IN BONN THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO SHARE OUR CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF POLISH DEVELOPMENTS WITH HIM SHORTLY BEFORE HE LEAVES.

WOESSNER

END OF MESSAGE

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